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UpdraftPlus Users: Delete Your UpdraftCentral Keys (What the Update Doesn’t Fix)

Featured card: delete your UpdraftCentral keys

Last updated 14 November 2026.

Short version first. Update UpdraftPlus to 1.26.13 or later (Premium 2.26.13 or later), then delete every UpdraftCentral key on the site that you don’t actively use. After that, check for planted plugins and hidden admin-level accounts, because the update does not remove them. Your backups keep working either way.

Why now? On 17–18 October 2026 someone got into teamupdraft.com using a compromised key, took connection keys for UpdraftCentral, and used them to push backdoor plugins onto WordPress sites. TeamUpdraft published an incident post, Nethemba published the first analysis of the backdoor, and Patchstack’s Dave Jong followed with a detailed write-up on 19 October. Credit to all three for getting the details out fast.

Below: what happened, what we found when we read the patched code ourselves, and a step-by-step check you can run today.

What happened

According to TeamUpdraft, the attacker got unauthorised access to teamupdraft.com through a compromised key. TeamUpdraft suspects AI was used to speed up the attack. The customer database is believed to have been accessed. That includes names, emails, billing addresses, order history, hashed passwords, 2FA settings, and the connection keys for UpdraftCentral, UpdraftVault and UpdraftClone. No card details were stored there.

Some things were not affected, per the vendor: plugin downloads, backups sitting in your own remote storage, and self-hosted UpdraftCentral.

With those keys, the attacker used UpdraftCentral Cloud connections to install malicious plugins and create accounts on connected sites. Patchstack’s telemetry puts the installs between 18 October 15:32 and 19 October 09:23, roughly 18 hours, and counts 99 distinct backdoor plugin names. No total site count has been published. For scale, UpdraftPlus has more than 4 million active installs according to the wordpress.org API on 14 November. That’s the install base, not the number of affected sites.

Two details matter a lot here:

  • This isn’t a code bug. Patchstack calls it “a key compromise, not a code flaw”. There’s no CVE. The commands were signed with genuine keys, so the plugin’s own checks passed exactly as designed.
  • The keys never expired. Keys issued in November 2025 still worked in October 2026.

There’s also a reason sites that never used UpdraftCentral can be on the hook. Before 1.26.14, connecting a TeamUpdraft.com account created an UpdraftCentral key by default: the “Add this website to UpdraftCentral” checkbox was ticked unless you unticked it. So a site could be enrolled without its owner ever opening UpdraftCentral.

Don’t confuse this with an older, separate issue: CVE-2026-10795 (CVSS 8.1, June 2026) let attackers forge UpdraftCentral commands without keys. That one was fixed in 1.26.5 / 2.26.5 and isn’t what happened in October.

How the backdoor works

Patchstack walked through the chain:

  1. A signed plugin.upload_plugin command arrives. WordPress installs and activates the plugin.
  2. The plugin watches for a URL parameter _xxxx= followed by a 32-character token.
  3. When it sees one, it creates an account with a hardcoded password and the Editor role, then adds manage_options and install_plugins to it.
  4. It logs the visitor in with a persistent cookie. That skips 2FA, login limits and login-protection plugins.

The account survives plugin removal. Deleting the plugin alone leaves the door open.

One odd twist: the samples Patchstack analysed had a coding error that causes a fatal error or HTTP 500. If you find a strange plugin breaking your site, do not “fix” it. Fixing it arms the backdoor.

Then on 29 October the vendor updated its post: some sites had been compromised without visible signs, and a planted plugin was left in place and later used to create an admin after the site had been disconnected. Keep that in mind for the next section.

What we found in the code

We downloaded UpdraftPlus 1.26.12, 1.26.13 and 1.26.14 from wordpress.org on 14 November and read them. Here’s what the fix actually does, and what it doesn’t.

The revocation runs on every page load

The key revocation is a method called udcentral_keys_revocation, hooked to plugins_loaded at priority 9. It runs on every request. It deletes a key only if both of these are true:

  • the key’s mothership is __updraftpluscom, meaning the cloud service, and
  • its created time is before 1792325220, which is 18 October 2026, 12:07 UTC (13:07 BST, matching the vendor’s post).

So self-hosted UpdraftCentral keys are left alone, and cloud keys created after the cutoff are kept. That’s a sensible, targeted design.

It only touches keys

Here’s the part that matters most. The revocation works on one thing: the updraft_central_localkeys option. It does not remove plugins. It does not remove users. It does not remove _sync_token options.

In plain words: updating cuts off the attacker’s future access through the old keys. It does nothing about anything already planted. If a backdoor plugin landed on your site during those 18 hours, it’s still there after the update, and so is any account it made. That lines up exactly with the vendor’s 29 October finding of a planted plugin creating an admin after the site was disconnected.

That’s the takeaway: the update closes the door, but it doesn’t check the house. You have to do that part.

Smaller things we noticed

  • The comment and the number disagree. The docblock says the cutoff “defaults to 17 October 2026 at 6:00 PM UTC”, but the timestamp in the code is 18 October 12:07 UTC. Trust the number, not the comment.
  • 1.26.12 and 1.26.13 have the same PHP. The 1.26.13 changelog says “Properly apply the revocation in 1.26.12”. We compared the md5 of every .php file in both wordpress.org zips, and apart from the version header they’re identical. Whatever changed was outside the plugin’s PHP, and we can’t tell what it was. In practice, both versions carry the same revocation code.
  • 1.26.14 stops auto-enrolling sites. In admin.php, checked="checked" was removed from the “add this website to UpdraftCentral” checkbox. The changelog: “Disabled the option to automatically add websites to UDCentral upon connection by default.” Good change.
  • Keys still don’t expire. 1.26.14’s changes to the central/ folder are code-style comments only. No key expiry was added. So deleting keys you don’t use is still the real fix.

Who needs to act

You are… What to do
Using UpdraftCentral Cloud Update, delete keys, run the full check below. You’re the main target.
A teamupdraft.com account holder Change your password (type the URL, don’t click email links) and anywhere you reused it. Reset 2FA. Watch for phishing. Delete keys and run the check, since connecting before 1.26.14 may have created a key.
Using UpdraftVault All sites were disconnected. Reconnect under Settings and run a manual backup.
Using UpdraftClone Old client keys are dead. Nothing to revoke there.
A free user, no teamupdraft.com account, never connected to UpdraftCentral Cloud Just keep UpdraftPlus updated.

Check and clean, step by step

Log in to each site directly, not through UpdraftCentral. The commands below use WP-CLI from the site’s root folder.

1. Update UpdraftPlus

Get to 1.26.13+ (free) or 2.26.13+ (Premium). The current free version is 1.26.14, released 26 October.

2. See if a key exists, then delete it

wp option get updraft_central_localkeys

Any output means a key exists. To delete keys in the dashboard: Settings › UpdraftPlus Backups › Advanced Tools › UpdraftCentral › Manage existing keys, and delete them all. Or from the command line:

wp option delete updraft_central_localkeys

Removing the site from the UpdraftCentral dashboard is not enough. The key on the site is what counts. Backups keep working without it.

3. Look for planted plugins

The best file-level indicator is the plugin description:

grep -rl "Small maintenance toolkit: keeps option storage tidy" wp-content/plugins/ wp-content/mu-plugins/

Also look in the Plugins screen, including the Must-Use tab, and browse wp-content/plugins and wp-content/mu-plugins over SFTP or SSH.

If you find one, don’t delete it from wp-admin: its uninstall routine erases traces. Deactivate it and move the folder out of the web root instead.

4. Look for backdoor accounts

wp user list --role=editor --fields=ID,user_login,user_email,user_registered

Then check whether any editor has admin rights it shouldn’t:

wp user list --role=editor --field=ID | xargs -I{} wp user list-caps {} | grep manage_options

Some of these accounts are hidden from the Users screen, so trust the command line or the database over wp-admin. Then look for the token option:

wp option list --search='*_sync_token'

Remove any backdoor account and any matching _sync_token option.

5. Check your server logs

grep 'class-udrpc\.php"' /var/log/apache2/*access*

The genuine User-Agent looks like WordPress/x; class-udrpc.php/2.0; https://teamupdraft.com. The attacker’s lacks the library version and the URL, so a line ending right after class-udrpc.php" is suspicious. Adjust the log path for your server.

6. Lock it down

wp config shuffle-salts

That logs everyone out. Then change admin and editor passwords, end any other sessions, and turn on 2FA.

7. If you were compromised

  • Restore from a clean backup taken before 17 October.
  • If the site was accessed via UpdraftCentral, re-authorise your remote storage and rotate the storage keys.
  • Reconnect to UpdraftCentral only after the checks are clean. If you need remote management, Patchstack notes that a key created under an account without install_plugins stopped the attack on one analysed site.

Indicators of compromise

Type What to look for
Plugin description “Small maintenance toolkit: keeps option storage tidy.” (best file-level indicator)
Plugin names “Site Health Cache” (strongest), Asset Forge 2, Core Smith, Image Forge, Quick Pack, WP Forge, Content Helper, Speed Kit. Names are randomised; 99 in total.
Usernames Two words plus two digits, e.g. data-ops43, media-staff96
Account details Email at @example.org, display name “Site Tools”; some hidden from the Users screen
Options An option name ending in _sync_token
IP addresses 43.250.53.42 and 2a09:bac5:4e21:2e3c::49b:9 (the attacker rotated within a day, so treat these as a starting point only)
UpdraftCentral log probe.central.updraftplus.com followed by Command received: plugin.upload_plugin
User-Agent Contains class-udrpc.php but no library version or URL

The bigger lesson

Every remote management dashboard (ManageWP, MainWP, InfiniteWP, UpdraftCentral, Jetpack) works the same basic way: a third party holds a key that can act on many sites. To be clear, the others weren’t part of this incident. But it’s worth five minutes to list which of these services hold a key to your site, and delete the ones you don’t use. A key you don’t use is all risk and no benefit.

It also fits a pattern we’ve been writing about all year. We counted 44 WordPress security fixes in 2026 against 2 in all of 2025, and earlier this month we covered the core upgrader flaw CISA flagged as exploited. Same message both times: updating closes the hole, it doesn’t remove something that already got in.

Frequently asked questions

I never used UpdraftCentral, am I affected?

Possibly. Before UpdraftPlus 1.26.14, connecting a TeamUpdraft.com account created an UpdraftCentral key by default, so a site could be enrolled without you ever using UpdraftCentral. Run wp option get updraft_central_localkeys or check Manage existing keys. If you have no teamupdraft.com account and never connected to UpdraftCentral Cloud, just keep the plugin updated.

Does updating UpdraftPlus remove the backdoor?

No. The update revokes old cloud keys created before 18 October 2026 12:07 UTC, but it only touches the updraft_central_localkeys option. It does not remove planted plugins, backdoor accounts or _sync_token options. You need to check for those yourself.

Will deleting the keys stop my backups?

No. Backups keep working after you delete UpdraftCentral keys. The keys only let a remote dashboard send commands to your site. If you use UpdraftVault, reconnect it under Settings and run a manual backup, because all Vault sites were disconnected.